How Michelson Tried to Launch an International Radio Station from Switzerland in 1938

While checking the archives of the League of Nations for an article about Radio-Nations, I came across a surprising name one that will be familiar to anyone interested in the history of radio: Charles Michelson. Michelson, who would later play a key role in the creation of Europe 1, worked in press advertising. In the 1930s, he also turned his attention to radio. In 1936, he acquired a small station struggling to survive in the international zone of Tangier, with the aim of turning it into a major commercial broadcaster. But his plans were thwarted.

Michelson was planning to build an international commercial station that he would later call Radio Imperial. After running into difficulties in Tangier, he began looking for other ways to pursue his project. In the summer of 1938, he tried to persuade the League of Nations and the Swiss telegraph company Radio-Suisse to lease him airtime. The League of Nations archives reveal how Geneva turned him down and why.

A Station with a Unique Status

A brief reminder: Radio-Nations, near Geneva, was established under an agreement dated June 8, 1930, between the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and Radio-Suisse, a public limited company specializing in wireless telegraphy and telephony. The 50-kW long-wave transmitter was located at Prangins, near Nyon, while the receiving station was at Colovrex. The shortwave transmitters had been purchased at the expense of the League of Nations, which owned them. Under normal circumstances, Radio-Suisse operated the station.

However, it came under the direct control of the League of Nations if the Secretary-General declared a time of crisis. Article 6 of the agreement gave the Secretary-General control over the programming of the shortwave transmitters. This was the key to the whole affair. Radio-Suisse could sell airtime, but not without the League of Nations’ approval.

A Proposal from Michelson

On June 27 and 28, 1938, Charles Michelson, who introduced himself as director of propaganda services for the National Association for Economic Expansion, a business organization, met in Bern with Dr. Rothen, director of Radio-Suisse. A subsequent internal memo from Geneva would refer to him as a man claiming to be head of propaganda. Michelson wanted to use the League of Nations’ transmitters for broadcasts aimed at French citizens living abroad, modeled on the programs that the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation was already broadcasting to Swiss citizens abroad with League of Nations authorization, following a March 25, 1937 letter.

He proposed fifteen-minute broadcasts, with no associated receiving station, aimed at five areas: Madagascar; Venezuela and northern Brazil; a section of the South Pacific between 10° and 25° south latitude; southern India; and the African coast along the Gulf of Guinea. Each broadcast was to fit into specific GMT time slots, and a single program could sometimes serve two regions.

The plan also included broadcasts that is, cultural or news reports relayed by a station in which the Association claimed to have an interest as well as a daily automatic telegraph news service. Michelson promised that all scripts would be submitted to Radio-Suisse, which would have the right to reject them, and that nothing in the project would infringe upon the sovereignty of either the League of Nations or the Swiss Confederation.

Why approach Geneva? According to Rothen, the Association did not have the necessary transmitting facilities in Paris. It claimed to be planning to install a transmitter near the capital, probably by the following summer, and presented Prangins as a temporary solution until then.

The Financial Incentive

For Radio-Suisse, the proposal came at an opportune moment. Rothen explained that the station was expecting an operating deficit in 1938. It had lost its connection with Shanghai, while broadcasts from Vienna and Salzburg to New York were now being routed through Berlin following the annexation of Austria. He therefore proposed a rate of 100 Swiss francs for fifteen minutes using one transmitter, plus 2 francs for each additional minute, or 150 francs when two transmitters were used. Telephone broadcasts would cost 200 francs for ten minutes, while telegraph transmissions would cost 100 francs. These rates assumed a minimum of sixteen broadcasts per month, and a deposit would be required because the Association was based abroad. Rothen nevertheless stressed that Radio-Suisse itself had no particular interest in the project and that the matter was entirely for the League of Nations Secretariat to decide.

Geneva Raises a Series of Objections

The Secretariat officials raised four separate sets of objections.

1. Technical considerations. After consulting Mr. Calame, head of Radio-Suisse’s operating office in Geneva, van Dissel of the Transit Section concluded on July 7 that the technical possibilities were very limited. There was no experience of reception in Madagascar or the Gulf of Guinea, and Prangins had no antenna directed toward those regions. For the Pacific zone, the antenna aimed at Japan could potentially be used, but there was no guarantee of satisfactory reception. Only broadcasts to Venezuela and India appeared feasible with any reasonable prospect of success. The proposed evening slots could also require reductions in broadcasts to NBC and CBS.

2. Financial considerations. In a July 6 memo, Metternich, the acting head of the Section, referred to the experience gained in the case of the Bolivian debt, although the file does not explain what this meant in detail. The apparent concern was that Radio-Nations should not enter into an agreement with an unfamiliar organization. In addition, the Association’s financial solvency was unknown.

3. The principle involved. A new agreement to lease airtime to a private individual required the express authorization of the Secretary-General, just as it did for broadcasts by Swiss organizations. The Swiss Broadcasting Corporation (SSR) was an established public broadcaster. By contrast, as far as Geneva knew, the Association had never been involved in radio. Moreover, the purpose of the proposed broadcasts appeared poorly defined, since several of the target regions had very few French residents or lacked the necessary relay facilities.

4. Michelson’s reputation and Paris’s position. This was the decisive issue. André Ganem of the Information Section sounded out the French Presidency of the Council. Its secretary-general replied that the project had greatly surprised him and appeared to contain several suspicious elements. He declared himself opposed to it. In a written response dated July 7, he said that such broadcasts should preferably be organized from Paris, in cooperation with the Union of French Abroad and Paris-Mondial, the French public shortwave service. He doubted that Michelson had contacted the Union and considered his project incomplete. Information gathered from various sources about Michelson was, according to Geneva, far from reassuring.

Rothen, for his part, wrote on July 15 that he saw no objection to proceeding, subject to technical tests. He sent Michelson the conditions Geneva would probably impose : the programs could contain no political or advertising material and would consist of music, theater, talks and news without commentary ; there could be no mention of the League of Nations or Radio-Nations ; the Secretary-General would retain the right to pre-empt airtime ; authorization could be withdrawn ; the contract would become void in the event of a time of crisis ; and scripts would have to be submitted for review forty-eight hours in advance, while never compromising Swiss neutrality. Van Dissel, however, maintained in a summary memo that he strongly advised against proceeding.

The Decision: Not to Antagonize France

On August 16, van Dissel sent the League of Nations Secretariat a memo that sheds light on the real reasons behind the decision. He recalled the only previous case: a proposal from Mr. Bing, a former director of United Press, which had been rejected by the Secretary-General because it contained unacceptable advertising for an official station (see below). Van Dissel then pointed out that the Michelson project very probably also involved advertising, but stressed that this was not the reason for his recommendation. His recommendation was based on the information concerning Michelson and, he wrote, on the most important reason : the opposition of the French Presidency of the Council to this type of broadcast.

On August 17, a memorandum addressed to the Secretary-General proposed instructing the Transit Section to reject the request, while taking care to assume that no reason needed to be given. The letter sent from Geneva on August 20 followed that recommendation precisely: the Secretary-General, acting under Article 6 of the 1930 agreement, was unable to give his assent. No reason was provided.

The Secretariat had weighed technical limitations, financial solvency, advertising, and the sensitivities of a member state France whose position it did not wish to antagonize. The request was therefore rejected without explanation, leaving Radio-Suisse, which had nevertheless been interested in the potential revenue, to communicate the The file contains neither Michelson’s July 13 letter nor his response to the refusal. Nor does it provide any information about the history of the Association itself.

Broadcasting to America from Geneva : The Radio Gamble of a Former United Press Executive

In early 1934, Dr. Edward J. Bing, a Hungarian journalist who had just left his position as head of United Press‘s European operations, proposed that the League of Nations lease him unused airtime on its shortwave station, Radio-Nations.

His idea was to establish regular broadcasts between Europe and North America, financed through advertising and fees paid by national radio stations. He had no experience in broadcasting, but believed strongly in the medium’s future. The draft agreement, negotiated with Radio-Suisse, which operated the station, reserved large blocks of nighttime and morning airtime for his future company at favorable rates: 100 Swiss francs for the first fifteen minutes, or 200 francs if a foreign station relayed the broadcast.

In return, the company would guarantee annual revenues of between 10,000 and 30,000 francs, while the League of Nations would retain priority and could use the facilities whenever necessary. Everything hinged on neutrality. Located in Switzerland, the station could not be used to harm the country, compromise its neutrality, or undermine its mission of peace. Advertising was to remain discreet, programs were to be announced one week in advance, and Radio-Suisse could refuse or even interrupt a broadcast.

In Geneva, the financial potential was real, but caution prevailed. The auditor was concerned about an unknown promoter and a company that did not yet exist. The Legal Section granted only an authorization that could be revoked at any time, without compensation. Others pointed out that nothing prevented Bing from reselling his rights. The proposed radio venture was never launched.